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Abstract
This paper examines private businesses' access to land and capital in Vietnam. It finds that the allocation of these resources to private firms is still excessively state-driven and personalised, and examines the links that business people of different ethnical and regional backgrounds have with the state and how this facilitates or hinders their access to land and capital. Lacking relationships with the state may have profound consequences for unconnected private enterprises, which are accordingly subject to uneven competition from connected ones. The paper suggests that private businesses' uneven opportunities are basically a consequence of the general history of the country and the role that individual business people have played in it, in such respects as having had former state-sector employment, party membership, the "side" they were on before and during the Vietnam War etc. In this, factors such as ethnicity, origin and present location in either northern or southern Vietnam play an important part.

Within the last decades, the share of government aid in overall external financial flows to developing countries has decreased. It is estimated that between 75 and 85% of all current financial flows to developing countries derive from a variety of private sources, including remittances, investment, commercial loans and charity, compared to some 65% in 1990. Similarly, it has been estimated that total private flows reached 647 billion USD in 2006, which is roughly four times their level in the 1980s. This may imply a diminished or different role for official financing from 'traditional' donors, at least in relative terms. This paper aims to provide an overview of recent and current changes in financial flows to developing countries. First, it explores the different types of financial flows to developing countries aiming at determining their recent and current importance. Second, to the extent possible, the tendencies described are broken down to particular developing countries or regions, and attention is also paid to whether or not the particular types of flows benefit certain sectors over others. Third, the described tendencies are compared, while their impact on developing countries is briefly discussed and concluded.

Individual differences in social and political attitudes have their roots in evolved motives for basic kinds of social relationships. Egalitarianism is the preference for the application of the one of these relational models-equality—over that of another—dominance—to the context of societal intergroup relations. We present recent research on the origins of egalitarianism in terms of universal social cognitive mechanisms (activated as early as infancy), systematic (partly heritable) individual differences, and the affordances and constraints of one's immediate and macro-structural context. Just as the psychological impact of socioeconomic conditions depends on the mind being equipped to perceive and navigate them, so the expression of the evolved underpinnings of inequality concerns depends critically on social and societal experiences.

Far-right political parties in Europe regularly portray Muslims and Islam as backward and a symbolic threat to secular and/or Christian European culture. Similarly, Islamist groups regularly portray Westerners and Western culture as decadent and a symbolic threat to Islam. Here, we present experimental evidence that meta-cultural threat - information that members of an outgroup perceive one's own culture as a symbolic threat to their culture - increases intention and endorsement of political violence against that outgroup. We tested this in three experimental studies among Muslims and non-Muslims in Scandinavia. In Studies 1 and 2, we experimentally manipulated whether the dominant majority group was portrayed as seeing Muslim culture and lifestyle as backward and incompatible with their own culture. These portrayals increased the endorsement of extremist violence against the West and violent behavioural intentions among Muslims living in Denmark and Sweden. Study 3 used a similar paradigm among non-Muslim Danes and demonstrated that learning about Muslims portraying the non-Muslim Danish in-group as a threat increased endorsement of ethnic persecution of Muslims, conceptually replicating the general effect that meta-cultural threat fuels endorsement of extremist violence among both majority and minority groups.

Physical cues influence social judgments of others. For example, shorter individuals are evaluated less positively than taller individuals. Here, we demonstrate that height also impacts one of the most consequential intergroup judgments - attributions of humanity - and explore whether this effect is modulated by the tendency to value hierarchy maintenance. In Study 1, the shorter participants perceived a range of out-groups to be, the more they dehumanized them, and this tended to be particularly pronounced among those scoring high on social dominance orientation (SDO). In Study 2, participants dehumanized an out-group more when they were led to believe that it was relatively short. Finally, Study 3 applied a reverse correlation approach, demonstrating that participants in general, and especially those scoring high on SDO, represented shorter groups in ways less consistent with full humanity than they represented taller groups. Together, this research demonstrates that basic physical height cues shape the perceived humanity of out-groups.

Majority-group members often hold negative attitudes toward minority-group members who identify with both the majority and their minority group. Integrating perspectives from social identity theory and acculturation research with a coalitional psychology framework, we show that an underlying mechanism for such bias is the perception that dual identifiers are disloyal to the majority group. In Study 1, majority-group participants in the U.S. questioned the loyalty of a dually identified Arab immigrant more than one who identified solely with the (American) majority group, especially under intergroup threat, which in turn predicted less favorable feelings toward the immigrant. Study 2 conceptually replicated the effect of the identity manipulation and the mediating influence of perceived loyalty on judgments about an immigrant being allowed to enlist in the U.S. military. Study 3, partially replicated the findings in Poland, focusing on Russian immigrants as targets. In Study 4, which independently manipulated both the identity expressed by immigrants and their loyalty, a dually identified immigrant whose loyalty to the majority group was portrayed as high was not judged as less qualified than an immigrant who identified only with the majority group for jobs with the potential to inflict damage on the majority group. Study 5, replicated and extended the previous studies in the context of fans of allied or rival soccer teams in Germany, revealing the moderating role of existing group relations on the hypothesized loyalty processes. In summary, coalitionally driven perceptions of (dis)loyalty appear to undergird bias toward minority-group members who hold dual identifications.

Islamist extremism is often explained by the suffering endured by Muslims in Islamic countries as a result of Western-led wars. However, many terrorist attacks have been carried out by European Muslims with no personal experiences of war. Across two studies among Danish Muslims, we tested if what we call victimization-by-proxy processes motivate behavioral intentions to commit acts of violence. We used Muslim identification, perceived injustice of Western foreign policies, and group-based anger to predict violent and nonviolent behavioral intentions. More importantly, we compared path models of Danish Muslims from conflict zones with those without direct personal experience of Western-led occupation. We found similar effects among the participants in each category, that is, vicarious psychological responses mimicked those of personally experienced adversity. In fact, participants born in Western Europe were, on average, more strongly identified with Muslims, more likely to perceive Western foreign policy as more unjust, reported greater group-based anger, and were more inclined to help Muslims both by nonviolent and violent means.

Islamist extremism is often explained by the suffering endured by Muslims in Islamic countries as a result of Western‐led wars. However, many terrorist attacks have been carried out by European Muslims with no personal experiences of war. Across two studies among Danish Muslims, we tested if what we call "victimization‐by‐proxy processes" motivate behavioral intentions to commit acts of violence. We used Muslim identification, perceived injustice of Western foreign policies, and group‐based anger to predict violent and nonviolent behavioral intentions. More importantly, we compared path models of Danish Muslims from conflict zones with those without direct personal experience of Western‐led occupation. We found similar effects among the participants in each category, that is, vicarious psychological responses mimicked those of personally experienced adversity. In fact, participants born in Western Europe were, on average, more strongly identified with Muslims, more likely to perceive Western foreign policy as more unjust, reported greater group‐based anger, and were more inclined to help Muslims both by nonviolent and violent means.

"Despite the fact that SDO and RWA are correlated with one another and both predict support for ethnic persecution of immigrants, it is argued that this aggression is provoked for very different reasons. For authoritarians, outgroup aggression against immigrants should primarily be provoked by immigrant refusal to assimilate into the dominant culture because this violates ingroup conformity. In contrast, SDO should be associated with aggression against immigrants who do assimilate into the dominant culture because this blurs existing status boundaries between groups. Using samples of American and Swiss college students, the data were consistent with this status boundary enforcement hypothesis regarding social dominators and largely consistent with the ingroup conformity hypothesis regarding authoritarians. National and ethnic identification did not account for these results. The results further support the argument that outgroup prejudice and discrimination is most fruitfully seen as an interactive function of individual differences and situational constraints." [author's abstract]

Whether and how societal structures shape individual psychology is a foundational question of the social sciences. Combining insights from evolutionary biology, economy, and the political and psychological sciences, we identify a central psychological process that functions to sustain group-based hierarchies in human societies. In study 1, we demonstrate that macrolevel structural inequality, impaired population outcomes, socio-political instability, and the risk of violence are reflected in the endorsement of group hegemony at the aggregate population level across 27 countries (n = 41,824): The greater the national inequality, the greater is the endorsement of between-group hierarchy within the population. Using multilevel analyses in study 2, we demonstrate that these psychological group-dominance motives mediate the effects of macrolevel functioning on individual-level attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, across 30 US states (n = 4,613), macrolevel inequality and violence were associated with greater individuallevel support of group hegemony. Crucially, this individual-level support, rather than cultural-societal norms, was in turn uniquely associated with greater racism, sexism, welfare opposition, and even willingness to enforce group hegemony violently by participating in ethnic persecution of subordinate out-groups. These findings suggest that societal inequality is reflected in people's minds as dominance motives that underpin ideologies and actions that ultimately sustain group-based hierarchy.